Introduction
The Yom Kippur (Atonement Day)War, also known as the Ramadan War, the October War, the 1973 Arab–Israeli War, or the Fourth Arab–Israeli War, was fought from 6 to 25 October 1973 between Israel and a coalition of Arab states led by Egypt and Syria. Most of the fighting occurred in the Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights, territories occupied by Israel in 1967. Some combat also took place in mainland Egypt and northern Israel. Egypt aimed to secure a foothold on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal and use it to negotiate the return of the Sinai Peninsula.
Historical Background
Israel’s stunning victory in the Six-Day War of 1967 left the Jewish nation in control of territory four times its previous size. Egypt lost the 23,500-square-mile Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip, Jordan lost the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and Syria lost the strategic Golan Heights.
When Anwar el-Sadat (1918-81) became president of Egypt in 1970, he found himself leader of an economically troubled nation that could ill afford to continue its endless crusade against Israel. He wanted to make peace and thereby achieve stability and recovery of the Sinai, but after Israel’s 1967 victory it was unlikely that Israel’s peace terms would be favorable to Egypt. So Sadat conceived of a daring plan to attack Israel again, which, even if unsuccessful, might convince the Israelis that peace with Egypt was necessary.
In 1972, Sadat expelled 20,000 Soviet advisers from Egypt and opened new diplomatic channels with Washington, D.C., which, as Israel’s key ally, would be an essential mediator in any future peace talks. He formed a new alliance with Syria, and a concerted attack on Israel was planned.
On October 6, 1973 — Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar (and during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan) — Egypt and Syria launched a coordinated surprise attack against Israel. The equivalent of the total forces of NATO in Europe was mobilized on Israel’s borders. On the Golan Heights, approximately 180 Israeli tanks faced an onslaught of 1,400 Syrian tanks. Along the Suez Canal, fewer than 500 Israeli defenders with only three tanks were attacked by 600,000 Egyptian soldiers, backed by 2,000 tanks and 550 aircraft.
Hosni Mubarak, who was the Egyptian Air Force commander, said he started the war by attacking an Israeli communications base in his fighter jet six minutes before the rest of the Arab armies’ surprise attack on the Jewish state began at 2:00 p.m. He said Sadat and two other people were the only ones informed of his mission.
At least nine Arab states, including four non–Middle Eastern nations (Libya, Sudan, Algeria, and Morocco), actively aided the Egyptian-Syrian war effort. A few months before the attack, Iraq transferred a squadron of Hunter jets to Egypt. During the war, an Iraqi division of some 18,000 men and several hundred tanks was deployed in the central Golan and participated in the October 16 attack against Israeli positions. Iraqi MiGs began operating over the Golan Heights as early as October 8 — the third day of the war.
Besides serving as financial underwriters, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait committed men to battle. A Saudi brigade of approximately 3,000 troops was dispatched to Syria, where it participated in fighting along the approach to Damascus. Also violating Paris’s ban on the transfer of French-made weapons, Libya sent Mirage fighters to Egypt. Other North African countries responded to Arab and Soviet calls to aid the front-line states. Algeria sent three aircraft squadrons of fighters and bombers, an armored brigade, and 150 tanks. Approximately 1,000 to 2,000 Tunisian soldiers were positioned in the Nile Delta. Sudan stationed 3,500 troops in southern Egypt, and Morocco sent three brigades to the front lines, including 2,500 men to Syria.
Lebanese radar units were used by Syrian air defense forces. Lebanon also allowed Palestinian terrorists to shell Israeli civilian settlements from its territory. Palestinians fought on the Southern Front with the Egyptians and Kuwaitis.
In September 2013, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak claimed that he personally started the Yom Kippur war during a secret mission during his time as an Egyptian air force commander. Mubarak stated that six minutes before the large attack on Israel commenced, including other Arab armies, he attacked an Israeli communications outpost in his fighter jet in the first attack of the war.
Political Causes of the War
· Egyptian Desire to Reverse the 1967 Six-Day War Humiliation
Egypt’s devastating defeat in the 1967 Six-Day War, where Israel captured the Sinai Peninsula, left a deep psychological and political scar. President Anwar Sadat, who assumed power in 1970, sought to restore Egyptian national pride and erase the stigma of the 1967 rout. The war was a calculated move to demonstrate military capability and force Israel to negotiate the return of Sinai. This narrative, while accurate, often overlooks Sadat’s broader diplomatic strategy, which aimed at aligning Egypt with the West rather than solely seeking military victory.
· Syrian Ambition to Reclaim the Golan Heights
Syria, under President Hafez al-Assad, aimed to recapture the Golan Heights, lost to Israel in 1967. The Golan’s strategic value, overlooking northern Israel, made its recovery a political priority. Assad’s regime, rooted in Ba’athist ideology, also sought to bolster its legitimacy through military success against Israel. However, Syria’s coordination with Egypt was limited, and Assad’s aims were more maximalist than Sadat’s, complicating the coalition’s objectives.
· Cold War Proxy Dynamics
The Yom Kippur War was a flashpoint in the Cold War, with the Soviet Union arming Egypt and Syria and the United States backing Israel. Soviet weapons, including MiG-21 jets and SA-6 missiles, emboldened Arab states, while U.S. support (e.g., Operation Nickel Grass airlift) ensured Israel’s survival. The superpowers’ involvement escalated tensions, bringing them close to direct confrontation.
· Sadat’s Diplomatic Strategy for Peace
Sadat’s primary goal was not military conquest but to break the diplomatic stalemate post-1967. By launching a limited war to seize the Suez Canal’s east bank, he aimed to force Israel and the U.S. to negotiate under UN Resolution 242, which called for Israel’s withdrawal from occupied territories. The war’s success in prompting U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy and the 1978 Camp David Accords vindicated this strategy.
· Arab Unity and Pan-Arabism
The war was framed as a collective Arab effort to counter Israel’s regional dominance, fueled by pan-Arabist sentiments. Egypt and Syria, supported by other Arab states (e.g., Jordan’s limited involvement), sought to reclaim lost territories and challenge Israel’s post-1967 territorial gains. However, the coalition was fragile, with differing national interests undermining unity.
· U.S. Diplomatic Inaction Pre-War
The Nixon administration, focused on détente with the Soviet Union, underestimated Arab frustration over Israel’s refusal to withdraw from occupied territories. Sadat’s overtures (e.g., via advisor Hafiz Ismail in 1973) for a peace deal contingent on Israel’s withdrawal were rebuffed, as Nixon and Kissinger prioritized domestic issues (e.g., Watergate) and Israeli elections. This inaction pushed Sadat toward war as a means to force U.S. engagement.
· OPEC and the Oil Embargo Threat
The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), led by Arab oil producers, wielded oil as a political weapon. The war’s timing aligned with OPEC’s growing assertiveness, and the subsequent oil embargo on the U.S. and Western Europe (post-war) amplified its geopolitical impact. Sadat likely anticipated that military action would rally Arab oil states, pressuring the West to lean on Israel.
Diplomatic Causes of the War
The war of Atonement fought on October 6 to 25 1973, stanched from a mix of diplomatic failures, unresolved regional tensions, and strategic miscalculation.
· Unresolved Arab-Israeli Conflict
The June war of 1967 left Egypt, Syria, and other Arab states humiliated after Israel occupied the Sinai Peninsula, Golan Heights, West Bank, and Gaza Strip. Diplomatic efforts, like UN Resolution 242 calling for Israeli withdrawal and peace, stalled due to differing interpretations—Israel emphasized peace guarantees, while Arab states focused on territorial return.
· Egypt Strategic Shift Under Anwar Sadat
After succeeding Nasser in 1970, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat sought to break the diplomatic stalemate. Expelling Soviet advisors in 1972 signaled Egypt’s willingness to align with the West, but U.S. and Israeli dismissal of Sadat’s peace overtures (e.g., partial Sinai withdrawal proposals) pushed him toward a limited war to force negotiations.
· Failure of Peace Initiatives
Post-1967, diplomatic attempts like the Jarring Mission (1967–1971) and U.S.-led Rogers Plan (1969) failed to bridge gaps. Egypt and Syria grew frustrated as Israel, feeling secure after its 1967 victory, showed little urgency to negotiate territorial concessions.
Aftermath
In 22 days of combat, about 15,000 soldiers died (of which two thousand were Israelis), and almost 40,000 soldiers were injured. Despite the final defeat, the successes that the Egyptian army reported at the beginning of the war helped to restore Egyptian nationalists’ confidence. Despite the regained confidence, many Arab leaders were convinced that Israel could not be beaten militarily and this, according to historians, encouraged peace negotiations.
In particular, Egypt began to normalise relations with Israel after the war and the conclusion of the peace treaty between the two nations in 1979 led to the expulsion of Egypt from the Arab League, which lasted until 1989. A few years after the peace signing, the Egyptian dictator Al-Sadat was killed in an attack. The oil-producing countries, in response to American aid granted to Israel, began an embargo on the United States and many other Western countries, which lasted until 1974. The price of oil increased by 400% and this caused the energy crisis of 1973, the effects of which were felt even in Italy, marking the end (together with other causes) of a long period of rapid economic growth that had begun in the 1950s.
Conclusion
The Yom Kippur war of 1973 was the result of a complex interplay of political, military, and diplomatic factors. The primary catalyst was Egypt and Syria’s desire to reclaim territories lost to Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War, driven by national pride and strategic imperatives. Egypt under president Anwar Sadat, sought to break the diplomatic stalemate and pressure Israel into negotiations, while Syria aimed to recapture the Golan Heights. The failure of post-1978 peace efforts, including the rejection of proposals like the Rogers Plan, deepened Arab frustration. Israel’s overconfidence in its military superiority and its settlement activities in occupied territories further escalate the tensions. Ultimately, these causes converged to ignite a war that reshaped Middle Eastern geopolitics, leading to eventual peace negotiations, most notably the Camp David Accords.
References
https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/background-and-overview-yom-kippur-war accessed on 4th May, 2025
https://www.american.edu/sis/news/20231006-50-years-on-explaining-the-yom-kippur-war.cfm accessed on 4th May, 2025
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/israels-1973-october-war-a-50-year-perspective/ accessed on 4th May, 2025
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02684527.2023.2235795 accessed on 5th May, 2025
History.com, “Yom Kippur War” https://www.history.com/articles/yom-kippur-war
Wikipedia, “Yom Kippur War” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War