The
BRICS Expansion at the 2023 Johannesburg Summit marked a pivotal shift in
global geopolitics. Hosted by South Africa, the summit invited six new
members—Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and
initially Argentina (which later withdrew)—to join the original five (Brazil,
Russia, India, China, and South Africa). Effective January 2024, this expanded
BRICS (now often called BRICS+) to represent over 40% of the world's population
and a significant share of global GDP, emphasizing reform of Western-dominated
institutions, de-dollarization efforts, and greater Global South influence. South
Africa's role as host and a founding member highlighted its balancing act in
foreign policy. Pretoria maintains deep economic ties with Western partners
like the US and UK (including trade agreements and investment), while
strengthening alignments with authoritarian-leaning BRICS members Russia and
China—evident in its neutral stance on Russia's invasion of Ukraine, close
trade with China, and hosting the summit despite ICC tensions over Putin.
Post-2023, South Africa has navigated this by prioritizing non-alignment:
deepening BRICS cooperation (e.g., via the New Development Bank) while
preserving Western partnerships for investment and aid. However, strains have
grown, including US criticism of Pretoria's Russia ties and its ICJ case
against Israel, pushing South Africa toward more assertive Global South
solidarity amid a multipolar world. This delicate equilibrium reflects its
ambition to champion African interests without fully alienating any major
power. This article tends to explore the context of the 2023 Johannesburg
Summit; The Balancing Act; The Benefits and Risks for South Africa at Post-2023
Johannesburg Summit, among others.
1. The 2023 Johannesburg Summit as a
Turning Point: BRICS Expansion and Its Immediate Geopolitical Implications
The 15th BRICS Summit, held in
Johannesburg, South Africa, from August 22–24, 2023, under the theme
"BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Mutually Accelerated Growth,
Sustainable Development and Inclusive Multilateralism," marked a pivotal
moment in the group's evolution. For the first time since its formation in 2009
(and inclusion of South Africa in 2010), BRICS announced a significant
expansion, inviting six new members: Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi
Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. These countries were set to join as full
members from January 1, 2024, though Argentina later withdrew its acceptance
under President Javier Milei in December 2023, while Saudi Arabia has
maintained ambiguity about formal entry. The summit, culminating in the
Johannesburg II Declaration, shifted BRICS from a primarily economic forum focused
on development finance and trade to a more explicitly geopolitical platform
advocating for a multipolar world order and reforms to Western-dominated
institutions like the UN, IMF, and World Bank.
This expansion was driven largely by
China and Russia, who sought to bolster the group's influence amid heightened
global tensions, including Russia's war in Ukraine and U.S.-China rivalry. The
inclusion of major oil producers (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran) and African states
(Egypt, Ethiopia) enhanced BRICS' control over global energy markets and
representation of the Global South, while also incorporating diverse political
regimes—from democracies to authoritarian states. The decision was framed as a
response to the perceived failures of the Western-led order, particularly in
addressing developing nations' concerns over debt, sanctions, and unequal
global governance. As a result, the expanded BRICS (now often called BRICS+)
represents over 40% of the world's population and approximately 30–37% of
global GDP, positioning it as a potential counterweight to the G7.
The immediate geopolitical
implications of the Johannesburg Summit were profound and multifaceted. First,
it accelerated the trend toward multipolarity by amplifying the Global South's
voice in international affairs. The summit underscored calls for
de-dollarization, alternative payment systems, and reforms to institutions like
the UN Security Council, challenging the U.S.-led liberal international order.
Russia's participation (via Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, as President Putin
attended virtually to avoid ICC arrest warrant issues) and the inclusion of
sanctioned states like Iran highlighted BRICS' role in weakening Western
sanctions through trade diversion and non-dollar transactions. This shift also
complicated Western efforts to isolate Russia and China, as new members like
Saudi Arabia and the UAE—traditionally U.S. allies—began hedging their
geopolitical bets.
For South Africa, the host and a
founding member, the summit exemplified its delicate balancing act between
Western partners (the U.S. and UK) and authoritarian alignments (Russia and
China). As a democracy with deep economic ties to the West (including
significant trade and investment), South Africa emphasized "inclusive
multilateralism" and non-alignment in the Johannesburg Declaration,
avoiding direct confrontation with the West. However, the expansion—pushed by
China and Russia—drew criticism from Western capitals and strained relations
with the U.S., particularly amid accusations of Pretoria's perceived
pro-Russian stance on Ukraine. South Africa's hosting also tested its
commitment to international law, as the ICC warrant against Putin raised
domestic and international debates over diplomatic immunity. Ultimately, the
summit reinforced South Africa's strategy of strategic autonomy, allowing it to
deepen ties with Russia and China while preserving economic links with the
West, though it highlighted tensions in its foreign policy.
2. South Africa’s Role in Hosting and
Navigating the Expansion: Domestic and Diplomatic Challenges
South Africa played a pivotal role
as the host of the 15th BRICS Summit in Johannesburg from 22–24 August 2023,
under the theme “BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Mutually Accelerated Growth,
Sustainable Development and Inclusive Multilateralism.” As the only African
member at the time, South Africa leveraged its chairship to champion the
continent’s interests while steering the bloc toward its most significant
expansion since its formation. President Cyril Ramaphosa announced the
invitation of six new members—Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia,
and the United Arab Emirates—with full membership taking effect on 1 January
2024 (Argentina later withdrew). This decision marked the transition to BRICS+
and positioned the group as a stronger voice for the Global South in
challenging Western-dominated institutions.
Hosting the summit, however, exposed
profound domestic and diplomatic challenges for South Africa. These stemmed
from the country’s commitment to non-alignment, its historical ties to Russia,
its obligations as an International Criminal Court (ICC) signatory, and the
need to maintain economic relations with Western partners (primarily the US and
UK). The summit highlighted South Africa’s delicate balancing act between
deepening ties with authoritarian-leaning BRICS partners (Russia and China) and
preserving credibility with the West.
Diplomatic Challenges: The Putin
Dilemma and Geopolitical Tensions
The most visible diplomatic crisis
arose from the ICC arrest warrant issued against Russian President Vladimir
Putin in March 2023 for alleged war crimes in Ukraine. As an ICC member, South
Africa was legally obligated to arrest Putin if he attended the summit,
creating a potential diplomatic rupture with Russia, a key BRICS ally. This
placed Pretoria in a “rock and a hard place” situation, as the African National
Congress (ANC) government’s ideological affinity for Russia—rooted in
Soviet-era support during apartheid—clashed with its international legal
commitments.
To resolve the impasse, South Africa
granted diplomatic immunity to all summit attendees in May 2023, though this
was controversial and did not fully resolve the issue. Putin ultimately
attended virtually, represented by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, averting a
crisis but underscoring South Africa’s vulnerability to Western pressure. The
episode strained relations with the US and UK, who viewed Pretoria’s reluctance
to condemn Russia’s invasion as evidence of alignment with authoritarian
regimes.
The expansion process itself
amplified these tensions. While South Africa supported enlargement to amplify
the Global South’s voice, internal divisions among BRICS members complicated
negotiations. China and Russia pushed aggressively for rapid expansion to
counter Western influence, while Brazil and India expressed caution over
diluting the group’s cohesion. South Africa, as host, mediated consensus on
guiding principles for expansion but faced criticism for aligning with Russia and
China’s geopolitical agenda, including de-dollarization efforts and resistance
to Western sanctions.
Domestic Challenges: Public
Opposition and Ideological Divisions
Domestically, the summit and
expansion decision triggered significant opposition. The ANC’s pro-Russia
stance clashed with public opinion surveys showing widespread South African
disapproval of Russia’s actions in Ukraine and skepticism toward historical
ties. Critics, including opposition parties and civil society, accused the government
of prioritizing ideological loyalty over national interests, such as economic
ties with the West.
The Putin warrant intensified
domestic debate, with accusations that the ANC’s “non-alignment” was
ideological rather than strategic, risking South Africa’s reputation as a
rule-of-law advocate. Hosting the summit amid economic challenges (e.g.,
load-shedding and fiscal pressures) also drew scrutiny, as resources were
diverted to security and logistics while domestic issues persisted.
Post-2023 Implications: Ongoing
Balancing Act
In the aftermath of the Johannesburg
Summit, South Africa has continued its balancing act. It has deepened BRICS
engagement—hosting outreach events and advocating for African priorities like
the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)—while maintaining economic
partnerships with the US and UK (e.g., through the African Growth and
Opportunity Act). The expansion has strengthened South Africa’s role as a
bridge between BRICS and Africa but heightened tensions with the West,
including debates over sanctions and ICC compliance.
Since the 2023 Johannesburg BRICS
Summit, which expanded the bloc by inviting six new members (effective 2024),
South Africa has deepened its economic and strategic alignments with Russia and
China. This reflects Pretoria's non-aligned foreign policy, aimed at
diversifying partnerships amid global multipolarity. China remains South
Africa's largest trading partner, while Russia provides niche strategic
benefits, particularly in energy, defense, and BRICS institutions. However,
these ties introduce significant risks, including economic imbalances,
geopolitical tensions with Western partners (US and UK), and concerns over debt
sustainability and sovereignty.
Benefits
Economic Ties with China
China is South Africa's dominant
economic partner. Bilateral trade reached approximately US$34 billion in 2023,
with South African exports to China valued at around US$12 billion in 2024
(primarily minerals like iron ore, platinum, and coal). Chinese imports to
South Africa totaled US$21-23 billion in recent years, providing affordable
goods and supporting industrial inputs. China has invested heavily in
infrastructure via the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), including renewable
energy and transport projects. South Africa has received over US$5 billion in
financing from the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) for 12 projects, many
focused on energy transition and sustainability. These ties support job
creation, technology transfer, and access to markets, while the NDB offers
alternative financing with fewer conditionalities than Western institutions.
Strategic Ties with China
China provides South Africa with
leverage in global forums, including de-dollarization efforts (e.g., local
currency settlements) and the NDB, which funds infrastructure without the
stringent governance requirements of the IMF or World Bank. This enhances
Pretoria's autonomy in the Global South.
Economic Ties with Russia
Russia's economic footprint is
smaller than China's. Trade is modest (South African exports to Russia around
US$300 million in 2024), focused on energy and agriculture. Benefits include
discounted wheat imports (mitigating food security risks) and cooperation in
nuclear energy (e.g., Rosatom's involvement in potential nuclear projects).
Russia
offers military cooperation, including joint exercises (e.g., 2023 drills with
China) and historical solidarity from the anti-apartheid era. This bolsters
South Africa's defense capabilities and aligns with its non-aligned stance.
Through BRICS and the NDB, Russia supports South Africa's push for
multipolarity and reforms in global governance.
Risks
Economic Risks
South Africa's trade with China is
highly imbalanced, with a persistent deficit (US$9-10 billion annually in
recent years) and accumulated outflows of over US$114 billion since 2000. This
limits value addition and exposes South Africa to commodity price volatility.
Russian ties add little economic value, as trade remains minimal and sanctions
limit opportunities. The NDB's benefits are offset by risks of over-reliance on
non-Western finance, potentially delaying reforms.
Debt and Dependency Risks
While not a classic "debt
trap" for South Africa (its Chinese debt is manageable), broader BRI
concerns include unsustainable projects and asset concessions elsewhere in
Africa. Over-dependence could erode economic sovereignty.
Geopolitical and Strategic Risks
Closer ties with Russia and China
strain relations with the US and UK, risking secondary sanctions or loss of
AGOA benefits (duty-free access supporting thousands of jobs). Military
cooperation with Russia amid the Ukraine war has drawn criticism, portraying
South Africa as tacitly supportive of Moscow. This undermines Pretoria's
mediation credibility and invites Western pressure.
Other Risks
Alignment with authoritarian regimes
may conflict with South Africa's constitutional values and human rights
commitments. Environmental and labor concerns from Chinese projects persist,
and Russia's instability adds uncertainty.
4. Pressures from Western Partners
(US/UK) and the Ongoing Balancing Act in a Multipolar World
The 2023 Johannesburg BRICS Summit
marked a pivotal moment in South Africa's foreign policy, as the bloc expanded
to include new members (Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United
Arab Emirates, with Indonesia joining in 2025). This expansion amplified South
Africa's role in promoting a multipolar world order, while intensifying
pressures from Western partners—the United States and United Kingdom—who viewed
the move as a challenge to Western-led institutions. South Africa, as a
founding BRICS member and host, faced heightened scrutiny for deepening ties
with Russia and China amid the ongoing Ukraine war, leading to accusations of
aligning with authoritarian regimes. This sub-topic examines these pressures
and Pretoria's persistent non-aligned balancing act, which seeks to preserve
economic ties with the West while advancing Global South interests.
Key Pressures from the US and UK
Western partners have exerted
diplomatic, economic, and political pressure on South Africa, particularly over
its perceived proximity to Russia and China post-2023 summit.
- Diplomatic and Security Concerns:
The US and UK criticized South Africa's neutral stance on Russia's invasion of
Ukraine, including joint naval exercises with Russia and China in February
2023, abstentions on UN resolutions condemning Russia, and hosting Russian
officials despite the ICC arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin. In 2023, US
Ambassador Reuben Brigety accused South Africa of supplying arms to Russia via
the cargo ship *Lady R*, sparking a diplomatic crisis. The US and UK framed
these actions as undermining Western sanctions and supporting authoritarianism,
with threats of punitive measures. The UK echoed these concerns, viewing BRICS
expansion as a "counterweight" to Western dominance.
- Economic Leverage via AGOA: The
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), providing duty-free access to the US
market, became a key pressure point. Renewal discussions in 2024–2025 tied
eligibility to alignment with US interests, with some US lawmakers advocating
exclusion of South Africa due to its BRICS ties and Russia stance. AGOA's
expiration in September 2025 heightened risks, as South Africa exported
billions in goods (e.g., vehicles, metals) under the program. Western partners
implied that closer alignment with Russia/China could jeopardize benefits.
- Broader Geopolitical Framing:
The US and UK portrayed BRICS as evolving into an anti-Western bloc, with South
Africa's role as host and advocate for multipolarity seen as problematic. In
2023–2025, US officials downplayed BRICS as a rival but pressured South Africa
to distance itself from Russia/China, especially amid Trump's second term,
which threatened tariffs on countries pursuing de-dollarization.
These pressures reflect a Western
effort to prevent South Africa from fully pivoting toward authoritarian
alignments, emphasizing shared democratic values and economic interdependence.
South Africa has maintained a policy
of "active non-alignment," rooted in its post-apartheid constitution
and historical ties to the Global South, refusing to fully align with either
the West or Russia/China.
- Non-Alignment in Practice:
Pretoria has abstained from condemning Russia outright, calling for dialogue
and peace while upholding sovereignty. It led an African peace mission to
Ukraine and Russia in 2023–2024, emphasizing diplomacy over sanctions.
Relations with China remain strong—bilateral trade exceeds $50 billion
annually, with China as South Africa's top partner—yet economic ties with the
West (e.g., EU and US investment) are prioritized for diversification and
technology transfer.
- Multipolar Vision:
South Africa advocates for a reformed global order, including UN Security
Council expansion and reduced Western dominance. BRICS serves as a platform for
this, but Pretoria avoids anti-Western rhetoric, stressing inclusive
multilateralism. The 2023 Johannesburg Declaration highlighted Global South
partnerships without directly challenging the West.
- Economic Pragmatism:
Despite a trade deficit with China (driven by raw mineral exports), South
Africa benefits from Chinese investment in infrastructure and manufacturing.
Meanwhile, Western ties via AGOA and FDI remain vital for jobs and
diversification. The GNU under Cyril Ramaphosa (post-2024 elections) has
reaffirmed non-alignment, engaging all partners without ideological commitment.
- Challenges and Risks:
Domestic opposition (e.g., from the Democratic Alliance) and economic
vulnerabilities (e.g., AGOA risks) constrain full alignment with Russia/China.
The balancing act risks perceptions of inconsistency, as seen in tensions over
the ICC and Ukraine.
In a multipolar world, South
Africa's strategy prioritizes sovereignty and economic interests over bloc
politics. It engages the West for investment and security while deepening BRICS
ties for influence, reflecting a pragmatic response to global fragmentation.
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