Africa's landscape of conflict
resolution and peacekeeping has long been shaped by a complex interplay of
internal dynamics and external influences. Since the post-colonial era,
external powers—ranging from former colonial states to emerging global
superpowers—have exerted significant sway over the continent's stability
efforts. This influence manifests through military interventions, economic
leverage, diplomatic maneuvering, and resource exploitation, often prioritizing
geopolitical interests over sustainable peace. From the Cold War proxy battles
in Angola and Ethiopia to contemporary counterterrorism operations in the
Sahel, external actors have both facilitated and undermined African-led
initiatives. The African Union (AU), United Nations (UN), and regional bodies
like ECOWAS face persistent challenges in asserting autonomy amid these
interventions. This article explores four crucial subtopics to dissect this
phenomenon: the geopolitical interests driving superpower interventions, the
role of regional organizations in countering external dominance, economic
leverage in prolonging conflicts, and the impact of multilateral frameworks on
peacekeeping efficacy. By examining these areas, we uncover how external powers
can either bolster or erode Africa's path to self-determined peace.
1. Geopolitical Interests and
Interventions by Global Superpowers
Africa remains one of the most
conflict-prone regions globally, with over 20 active armed conflicts as of
2025, ranging from insurgencies in the Sahel to civil wars in Sudan and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). These conflicts have displaced
millions, exacerbated humanitarian crises, and hindered economic development.
Global superpowers—primarily the United States (US), China, and Russia—play
pivotal roles in African conflict resolution and peacekeeping efforts. Their
involvement is driven by geopolitical interests, including resource access,
strategic positioning, and ideological competition, often complicating
multilateral initiatives like those led by the United Nations (UN) and the
African Union (AU). While superpower interventions can provide resources and
diplomatic leverage, they frequently prioritize national agendas over
sustainable peace, leading to fragmented efforts and prolonged instability.
This analysis examines these dynamics, drawing on recent scholarly and policy
assessments.
The superpowers view Africa as a
theater for great-power competition, where influence over fragile states can
secure economic gains, counter rivals, and shape global norms. Africa's vast
natural resources (e.g., critical minerals like cobalt and lithium essential
for green energy transitions), strategic maritime routes (e.g., the Red Sea and
Gulf of Aden), and growing consumer market of 1.4 billion people amplify its
appeal. The US sees Africa as a bulwark against Chinese and Russian expansion,
emphasizing counterterrorism and democratic governance to maintain the
"rules-based international order." China prioritizes economic
dominance through infrastructure investments under the Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI), viewing Africa as a gateway to Global South leadership and a hedge
against US containment. Russia, constrained by sanctions post-Ukraine invasion,
pursues opportunistic alliances with juntas and resource-rich regimes to
undermine Western influence and fund its military-industrial complex.
|
Superpower |
Primary
Interests |
Key
Examples in Africa |
|
United States |
Counterterrorism, resource
security, promotion of liberal democracy and human rights; countering
China/Russia to protect global supply chains. |
Access to minerals in DRC;
military bases in Djibouti; aid to counter extremism in Sahel. |
|
China |
Economic expansion via BRI;
resource extraction (e.g., oil, minerals); diplomatic support in UN;
non-interference to build soft power. |
Investments in Angola's oil;
peacekeeping in South Sudan to protect investments; influence in East Africa
via loans. |
|
Russia |
Arms sales, resource extraction
(e.g., gold, diamonds); anti-Western alliances with authoritarian regimes;
proxy influence via mercenaries. |
Wagner/Africa Corps operations in
Mali, CAR; support for juntas in Sahel to expel French forces. |
This competition echoes Cold War
proxy dynamics but is more fragmented, with superpowers often aligning with the
same actors (e.g., US and China both supporting Ethiopian government in Tigray
conflict) rather than direct opposition. However, it risks escalating tensions,
as seen in the Red Sea where US, Chinese, and Russian naval interests overlap.
Interventions in African Conflicts:
Strategies and Examples
Superpower interventions blend
military, economic, and diplomatic tools, often bypassing traditional UN-led
models in favor of bilateral or proxy arrangements. The US employs a mix of
aid, training, and drone strikes, focusing on counterterrorism (e.g., AFRICOM
operations in Somalia against al-Shabaab). China adheres to "non-interference"
but increasingly mediates (e.g., brokering Ethiopia's 2022 Tigray peace talks)
and deploys private security to protect BRI assets in volatile areas like CAR.
Russia favors direct military support via the Wagner Group (rebranded Africa
Corps in 2023), deploying mercenaries to prop up regimes in exchange for mining
concessions, as in Sudan and Libya.
Key examples illustrate these
patterns:
-Sahel Coups (2020–2025):
Post-coup juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger expelled French and UN forces
(MINUSMA withdrawal in 2023), turning to Russia for Wagner-backed
counterinsurgency against jihadists. This shifted regional dynamics, weakening
ECOWAS mediation efforts and allowing Russian resource extraction (e.g., gold
in Mali). US drone support continued but was undermined by reduced French
cooperation.
-Sudan Civil War (2023–ongoing): US
and EU mediated the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement, but Russia's support for Rapid
Support Forces (RSF) via Wagner arms prolonged fighting, complicating AU-led
talks. China, invested in Port Sudan oil, hosted indirect talks in 2024 but
prioritized evacuating its citizens over resolution.
-DRC Instability: US
and UN (MONUSCO) focus on protecting civilians from M23 rebels, backed covertly
by Rwanda. China secures cobalt mines via economic diplomacy, while Russia
sells arms to Kinshasa, fragmenting peace efforts.
These
interventions often succeed short-term (e.g., stabilizing regimes) but fail
long-term, as they exacerbate grievances like corruption and inequality,
fueling extremism.
Impact on Peacekeeping Efforts
Peacekeeping in Africa, dominated by
UN missions (e.g., 75% of global deployments), faces erosion from superpower
rivalry. The UN Security Council (UNSC) deadlock—Russia and China vetoing resolutions
on human rights or sanctions—has stalled mandates, as in Ethiopia (2021 Tigray
conflict) where veto threats blocked enforcement. This has prompted a shift to
African-led operations under AU and Regional Economic Communities (RECs), like
the G5 Sahel Force or East African Community (EAC) mission in DRC, which
prioritize rapid response over UN bureaucracy.
Positive impacts include:
-Resource Infusion:
China contributes 2,500+ troops to UN missions (top P5 contributor) and $200
million to the UN Peace and Development Trust Fund, aligning with BRI goals. US
training bolsters AU capabilities (e.g., $100 million for African Standby
Force).
-Regional Ownership:
AU missions like AMISOM in Somalia have contained al-Shabaab, fostering local
mediation.
Negative impacts dominate:
-Fragmentation:
Rival interventions create "patchwork" security (e.g., Russian
mercenaries alongside UN in CAR), undermining coordination and accountability.
Withdrawals like MINUSMA enabled jihadist gains.
-Erosion of Norms:
Russia's "no-limits" arms deals with juntas prioritize order over
justice, weakening AU non-indifference principles.
-Funding Gaps:
AU operations rely on external donors (80% from EU/US), but competition diverts
resources—e.g., China's BRI loans outpace US aid, sidelining peacekeeping.
Overall, competition has reduced UN
effectiveness (e.g., no new major deployments since 2014) while empowering
AU/REC models, though these lack sustainable financing.
Case Studies
Sahel Region: Proxy Wars and Mission
Failures
The Sahel's jihadist insurgencies
(e.g., JNIM) have seen French Operation Barkhane (US-backed) collapse amid
coups, replaced by Russian Africa Corps in Mali (2022–2025). This high-reward,
low-cost Russian strategy secured uranium access but worsened violence,
displacing 4 million. UN peacekeeping faltered due to UNSC vetoes on robust
mandates, forcing reliance on G5 Sahel (funded by EU but undermined by Russian
disinformation). Outcome: Heightened instability, with superpowers exploiting
juntas for influence rather than resolution.
Horn of Africa: Resource-Driven
Diplomacy
In Ethiopia's Tigray War
(2020–2022), US sanctions pressured Addis Ababa, while China mediated the
Pretoria Agreement, protecting its $13 billion investments. Russia's arms sales
to Eritrea prolonged fighting. UN/AU efforts (e.g., IGAD mediation) succeeded
partially due to African agency, but rivalry delayed humanitarian access,
killing 600,000. Post-war, competition persists over Red Sea ports, complicating
EAC peacekeeping in Somalia.
Central African Republic: Mercenary
"Stabilization"
Wagner's 2018 deployment backed
President Touadéra against rebels, securing gold mines amid UN MINUSCA's
mandate constraints. China evacuated 200 citizens in 2019 but contributed
troops to MINUSCA. US sanctions on Wagner (2023) had limited impact, as Russia
vetoed UNSC extensions. Result: Nominal stability for the regime, but 1 in 5
displaced and ongoing atrocities.
2. Role of Regional and Continental
Organizations in Countering External Dominance
Regional and continental
organizations in Africa—primarily the African Union (AU) and Regional Economic
Communities (RECs) such as the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Southern African
Development Community (SADC), and Economic Community of Central African States
(ECCAS)—play a critical role in countering external dominance by global
superpowers (US, China, Russia) in conflict resolution and peacekeeping. These
bodies embody the principle of "African solutions to African
problems," as enshrined in AU's Agenda 2063 and the African Peace and
Security Architecture (APSA). Amid superpower rivalry, which fragments efforts
and prioritizes bilateral deals (e.g., Russian mercenaries in the Sahel),
RECs/AU assert sovereignty through mediation, rapid-response missions, and
norm-setting. However, resource constraints and internal divisions limit their
efficacy. This analysis examines their strategies, impacts, challenges, and
successes, drawing on 2020–2025 data from UN, AU reports, and scholarly
sources.
Mandate and Structures for Countering
External Influence
The AU's Constitutive Act (2000) and
Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC,
2002) grant it authority to intervene in grave circumstances (Article 4(h)),
bypassing traditional non-interference. APSA integrates RECs as pillars,
enabling subsidiarity: RECs handle regional crises, escalating to AU for
continental coordination. Key mechanisms include:
Strategies to Counter External
Dominance
RECs/AU
employ four interconnected strategies:
1. Normative Resistance:
Enforcing AU rules like zero-tolerance for unconstitutional changes (11
suspensions since 2020) rejects Russian-backed juntas, contrasting China's
"non-interference."
2. Rapid-Response Missions:
ASF brigades enable deployments within 14 days, bypassing UN delays. SADC's DRC
Mission (SAMIDRC, 2023) secured mineral zones from Chinese/Rwandan proxies
without external troops.
3. Mediation Ownership:
REC-led talks exclude superpowers unless invited. IGAD's Sudan process
(2023–2025) marginalized Russian RSF support, achieving partial Jeddah
ceasefire.
4. Economic Leverage:
AU's African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) ties peace to trade, reducing
aid dependency. ECOWAS sanctions cut Sahel juntas' GDP by 20%, forcing Russian
concessions.
5. Hybrid Partnerships:
AU-UN "Silencing the Guns" (2020 extension to 2030) funds RECs via
assessed contributions (20% target by 2025), diluting bilateral dominance.
These strategies have reduced
external troop presence: French Barkhane exited Sahel (2022); Wagner scaled
back in Mali (2024).
Case Studies
1. Sahel Coups (ECOWAS vs.
Russia/France, 2020–2025)
ECOWAS deployed ESF monitors and
imposed sanctions, expelling French MINUSMA (2023) and blocking full Russian
takeover in Niger. Outcome: Juntas isolated, violence down 15% in 2024; AU
mediation restored Burkina Faso elections.
2. Ethiopia-Tigray War (IGAD/AU,
2020–2022)
AU's "Homegrown" mediation
(Ossachie Roadmap) and IGAD facilitation achieved Pretoria Accord, rejecting US
sanctions/Chinese bilateral deals. Result: 90% ceasefire compliance; 2 million
refugees returned.
3. DRC Eastern Conflict (SADC/AU,
2023–Ongoing)
SAMIDRC (5,000 troops) neutralized
M23 advances, securing cobalt mines from Rwandan/US influences. AU PSC
authorized ASF escalation (2024). Outcome: 30% violence reduction; Luanda
Process advanced.
4. Central African Republic (ECCAS/AU
vs. Wagner, 2018–2025)
MNJTF
and AU's MISCA precursor contained rebels, with PSC condemning Wagner (2023).
Result: Regime stabilized without mercenaries dominating; UN MINUSCA extended
via AU push.
3. Economic Leverage and Resource
Exploitation in Prolonging Conflicts
Economic leverage refers to the use
of financial, trade, or investment tools by domestic or foreign actors to
influence conflict dynamics, often through aid, sanctions, or support for
factions to secure strategic advantages. Resource exploitation, meanwhile,
involves the extraction and trade of natural resources like minerals, oil, and
diamonds, frequently illicitly, to fund belligerents. In Africa, these factors
play a pivotal role in prolonging conflicts by transforming wars into
profitable enterprises, entrenching spoilers, and attracting external
interventions that prioritize economic gains over peace. This sub-topic draws
on case studies from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sierra Leone,
Sudan, Nigeria, and others to illustrate their mechanisms and impacts on
conflict resolution and peacekeeping efforts.
Role of Resource Exploitation in
Prolonging Conflicts
Resource exploitation sustains
conflicts by creating self-perpetuating war economies where armed groups derive
revenues from extraction, reducing their incentives to negotiate peace and
enabling prolonged violence. In resource-rich economies, abundant natural
resources often exacerbate instability rather than foster development, as they
fund arms trafficking, recruitment, and operations while fostering corruption
and inequality. This "resource curse" shifts conflicts from
grievance-based (e.g., political exclusion) to greed-driven, where fighting
becomes economically rational.
In the DRC, exploitation of minerals
like coltan, cassiterite, cobalt, and copper by rebels, militias, and foreign
actors (e.g., Rwanda and Uganda) has prolonged the conflict since 1996. Armed
groups control mining sites, taxing artisan miners and generating millions in
revenue—such as $800,000 monthly from the Bisie cassiterite mine— to purchase
weapons and sustain fragmentation into fiefdoms. This has resulted in over 4
million deaths and ongoing eastern instability, with resources creating a
"vicious circle" of plunder funding further hostilities. Similarly,
in Sierra Leone's 1991–2002 civil war, alluvial diamonds were looted by the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and government forces, smuggled through
Liberia, and used to buy arms, extending the conflict by making war profitable
and eroding state legitimacy through corruption.
In Sudan, oil exploitation primarily
benefited the Khartoum government, providing military advantages and prolonging
the 20-year civil war, though southern rebels later disrupted installations to
counter this asymmetry. In Nigeria's Niger Delta, oil extraction by companies like
Shell, allied with the state, has led to environmental degradation and revenue
appropriation, fueling militant groups like the Movement for the Survival of
the Ogoni People (MOSOP) and prolonging unrest through repression and unequal
distribution. Sudan's civil war also had ecological dimensions, with resource
scarcities and state favoritism toward elites sustaining violence. These cases
demonstrate how easily lootable resources equalize military capacities in
decentralized conflicts (e.g., DRC, Sierra Leone), while non-lootable ones like
oil exacerbate government-rebel asymmetries (e.g., Sudan, Nigeria), but both
entrench predation and civilian targeting.
Broader patterns include illicit
trade in timber and gems in Liberia and Angola, where dependence on high-value
exports created "paradoxes of plenty," weakening institutions and
enabling banditry. Environmental pressures, such as those around Lake Chad,
further intensify local conflicts over shrinking resources amid uneven
development.
Role of Economic Leverage in
Prolonging Conflicts
Economic leverage by foreign powers
often prolongs African conflicts by providing financial or military support to
factions in exchange for resource access, geopolitical influence, or strategic
positioning, thereby sustaining instability. Colonial legacies of
extraction-oriented economies have left weak states vulnerable to neo-colonial
interferences, where external actors exploit resources, draining approximately
$90 billion annually in illicit flows and exacerbating poverty.
In Sudan and Libya, interventions by
France, Turkey, Russia, and the UAE have fueled wars through arms supplies and
proxy support, prioritizing economic interests like oil and minerals over
resolution. Russia's Wagner Group (now Africa Corps) has leveraged gold mining
concessions in Sudan and the Central African Republic for military backing,
while the UAE provides drones and funding to Sudanese factions for access to
ports and resources. In the Sahel, French operations like Barkhane have been criticized
for focusing on counterterrorism while enabling resource exploitation by
multinationals, contributing to coups and prolonged insurgencies.
Great power rivalry— involving the
US, China, Russia, and others— treats Africa as an arena for courtship, offering
infrastructure deals or aid to secure minerals critical for global supply
chains, such as cobalt in the DRC. This competition drowns out African agency,
with debt distress in 15 states limiting sovereignty and fostering dependency
that sustains conflicts. For instance, in the DRC, Ugandan and Rwandan
interventions were economically motivated, using "tit-for-tat" rebel
sponsorship to access minerals. Such leverage creates "permanent
wars" under capitalism, where militarism and external influence hinder
self-determination.
Impact on Conflict Resolution
Economic leverage and resource
exploitation undermine resolution by rewarding spoilers and complicating
negotiations. In Sierra Leone, the 1999 Lomé Agreement's resource concessions
to the RUF led to renewed fighting, while in the DRC, power-sharing deals
failed to curb eastern war economies. Successful strategies include targeted
sanctions and transparency, as in Angola and Liberia, where diamond and timber
embargoes, combined with Kimberley Process certification, cut funding and
facilitated peace.
However, sanctions have mixed
results due to enforcement challenges and humanitarian impacts; in the DRC,
they were avoided to support the government, favoring governance reforms
instead. Actor-based approaches—coercive for brutal spoilers, conditional for
unreliable parties—emphasize "naming and shaming" via UN panels and
avoiding impunity. Foreign leverage often prioritizes short-term gains,
delaying inclusive processes like those in Mozambique's Maputo Accord, which
integrated economic redistribution. Root causes like inequality and illicit
arms trade must be addressed through development, as military solutions alone
fail.
Impact on Peacekeeping Efforts
These factors strain peacekeeping by
creating under-resourced missions facing resource-fueled militias and external
interferences. UN operations in Africa, comprising half of global missions,
struggle with funding dependencies on donors like the US and China, leading to
mismatched mandates and sustainability issues. In the DRC's MONUSCO, broad
tasks like civilian protection in vast areas are hampered by reluctance to
confront rebels, resulting in protests and withdrawal requests amid ongoing
displacement.
Resource monitoring has improved
outcomes, as in Liberia's UNMIL, which aided sanctions enforcement and
governance reforms, leading to lifts. However, allegations of peacekeeper
exploitation (e.g., MONUC gold trafficking) erode trust. Regional efforts like
the AU's ATMIS in Somalia face similar donor reliance, blurring lines between
peacekeeping and counterinsurgency. Economic leverage complicates mandates, as
veto powers delay responses (e.g., Darfur), while illicit flows sustain arms
proliferation. Reforms like the UN's Action for Peacekeeping initiative seek
targeted mandates and AU coordination, but progress is limited without
addressing root economic drivers.
4. Impact of Multilateral Frameworks
and Sanctions on Peacekeeping Efficacy
Multilateral frameworks refer to
international and regional organizations, agreements, and collaborative
mechanisms—such as the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and others—that facilitate peacekeeping
operations (PKO) in Africa. Sanctions, typically imposed by the UN Security
Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, include arms embargoes, asset
freezes, travel bans, and economic restrictions aimed at coercing behavioral
changes in conflict parties. This section assesses their combined and
individual impacts on the efficacy of peacekeeping in African conflict
resolution, defined as the ability of PKO to protect civilians, reduce
violence, implement peace agreements, and foster sustainable stability. Africa
hosts the majority of global PKO, with over 50,000 UN troops deployed across
missions like MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and MINUSCA in
the Central African Republic (CAR), alongside AU-led efforts such as the
African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). While these tools have
stabilized some conflicts, their efficacy is undermined by funding shortages,
political divides, enforcement gaps, and unintended humanitarian consequences.
Overview of Multilateral Frameworks
in African Peacekeeping
Multilateral
frameworks have been central to African peacekeeping since the 1960s, with the
UN authorizing over 30 missions in the continent, representing half of its
global operations. The UN Security Council oversees these under principles of
host consent, impartiality, and limited force, often in partnership with
regional bodies like the AU's Peace and Security Council, which has deployed
over 70,000 personnel across 17 countries. ECOWAS and other sub-regional
groups, such as the Lake Chad Basin Commission's Multinational Joint Task
Force, complement these efforts through ad hoc security operations. The EU has
provided logistical and financial support, though its involvement has waned due
to withdrawals from missions like those in Mali amid local hostilities.
These frameworks enhance efficacy by
enabling resource sharing, such as UN funding for AU missions under Resolution
2719 (2023), which aims to cover 75% of costs for African-led operations.
Research indicates that PKO correlate with reduced civilian and military
deaths, particularly when forces are diverse and mandates are robust, making
them cost-effective alternatives to unilateral interventions. Successes include
UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone (1999–2005), which disarmed combatants and ended a
civil war through coordinated international support, and ECOWAS's ECOMOG in
Liberia, which facilitated ceasefires and elections. However, efficacy is
hampered by stretched mandates, logistical delays, and host government
reluctance, as seen in recent UN withdrawals from Mali and the DRC. The crisis
of multilateralism—exacerbated by U.S. retreats from global institutions and
geopolitical rivalries—has led to funding shortfalls, with AU missions relying
on external donors for over two-thirds of budgets, eroding operational
readiness and partnership equity. African states bear disproportionate human
costs, "paying the price in blood" without commensurate financial or
political influence, which undermines trust and long-term conflict resolution.
Role of Sanctions in African Conflict
Resolution
Sanctions have evolved from
comprehensive state-wide measures to targeted ones against individuals,
entities, or sectors, aiming to minimize humanitarian harm while pressuring
conflict parties. Over half of the UN's 13 active regimes target African
states, often through arms embargoes to curb weapon flows in civil wars. Their
effectiveness is mixed: they succeed when integrated with diplomatic efforts
and enforced robustly, but fail due to political divides, evasion, and weak
monitoring. Variables like the target's GDP per capita and foreign direct
investment dependence positively correlate with success, as economically
vulnerable states are more responsive, while larger economies resist.
In Africa, sanctions have aided
resolution in cases like South Africa, where international pressure ended
apartheid in the 1990s, and Liberia, where a 2003 timber trade ban contributed
to Charles Taylor's ouster. Targeted sanctions against governments increase negotiation
odds by 224% in civil wars by shifting power asymmetries and resolving
information gaps. However, arms embargoes have a poor track record, prolonging
conflicts in Angola, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Rwanda due to delays and
evasion. In Sudan, 2006 sanctions on four individuals for Darfur atrocities
were criticized as insufficient, diluted by China's vetoes to protect oil
interests. Failures in Zimbabwe and Syria highlight how sanctions can
exacerbate humanitarian crises, foster illicit activities, and strengthen
regime resolve without achieving political change. Political divides in the
Security Council, with Russia and China vetoing monitoring panels (e.g., Mali
in 2023), further weaken regimes, eroding their legitimacy and impact on peace
efforts.
Interplay Between Multilateral
Frameworks, Sanctions, and Peacekeeping Efficacy
The integration of sanctions within
multilateral frameworks can enhance peacekeeping efficacy by limiting arms
proliferation, incentivizing negotiations, and supporting PKO mandates, but
often results in suboptimal outcomes due to inconsistencies. For instance, UN
arms embargoes in Liberia (1992) complemented ECOMOG and UNOMIL by restricting
factional weapons, facilitating disarmament and elections, though mistrust
delayed full resolution. In Somalia, the transition from ATMIS to AUSSOM (2025)
faces funding crises amid multilateral inertia, compounded by lifted arms
embargoes that targeted non-state actors but risked re-escalation without
robust peacekeeping support. Positive synergies occur when sanctions align with
benchmarks like judicial reforms, as in CAR, aiding transitions to stability.
Conversely, sanctions can undermine
efficacy by causing humanitarian harm—e.g., obstructing aid deliveries or
routine transactions—which erodes host consent and complicates civilian
protection mandates. In South Sudan, arms embargoes hinder military responses
to threats, frustrating African stakeholders and leading to calls for lifts,
while diluting multilateral unity. Political divides exacerbate this, with
vetoes preventing new regimes and weakening existing ones, as in Mali where
sanctions obstructed peace processes despite government requests. Overall,
while frameworks provide structure for sanctions enforcement (e.g., expert
panels), their efficacy in conflict resolution is limited without addressing
root causes like poverty and ethnic marginalization, often leaving PKO as
temporary stabilizers rather than transformative tools.
Case Studies
-Liberia:
Multilateral efforts via ECOWAS (ECOMOG) and UN (UNOMIL/UNMIL) combined with UN
sanctions (arms embargo and timber ban) pressured Taylor's regime, leading to
his 2003 exile and conflict resolution. However, initial inefficacy stemmed
from delayed enforcement and unaddressed tribal exclusions, resulting in
re-emerging violence post-1997 elections.
-Rwanda:
OAU and UN mechanisms (NMOG, UNAMIR) failed to prevent the 1994 genocide
despite mediation, with sanctions absent or ineffective. Delays in troop
reinforcements and mandate limitations highlighted multilateral weaknesses,
risking relapse without post-conflict peace-building.
-Somalia:
AU-led ATMIS, backed by UN logistics, has shifted to counterinsurgency, but
funding crises and geopolitical divides threaten the 2025 AUSSOM transition.
Lifted arms embargoes aid state-building but risk arming non-state actors,
illustrating sanctions' double-edged impact on peacekeeping.
-Sudan/Darfur:
Diluted UN sanctions on individuals failed to halt atrocities, weakened by
China's influence, while AU-UN hybrid missions struggled with enforcement,
prolonging instability.
Challenges and Recommendations
Challenges include funding
inequities, veto-driven dilutions, enforcement gaps, and humanitarian
backlashes, which collectively reduce PKO's ability to address intra-state
conflicts rooted in poverty and governance failures. To improve, multilateral
frameworks should prioritize equitable burden-sharing, flexible mandates with
troop-contributing input, and rapid deployment via AU-UN hybrids. Sanctions
should target governments selectively, incorporate humanitarian carve-outs, and
tie to clear benchmarks for easing, enhancing negotiation incentives.
Strengthening AU self-funding and regional coordination could mitigate external
dependencies.
Conclusion
The influence of external powers on
African conflict resolution and peacekeeping remains a double-edged
sword—offering resources and diplomatic heft while imposing agendas that erode
sovereignty and sustainability. Through geopolitical interventions, regional
pushback, economic exploitation, and multilateral inconsistencies, superpowers
like the U.S., China, and Russia have reshaped conflicts from the Sahel to the
Horn of Africa, often at the expense of AU and ECOWAS autonomy. The four
subtopics examined reveal systemic patterns: interventions prioritize rivalry
over resolution, economic leverage fuels prolongation, and frameworks reflect
power imbalances. To forge a resilient future, Africa must amplify the AU's
Agenda 2063, diversify funding via African Standby Force, and advocate UNSC
reforms for equitable representation. Ultimately, true peace demands a paradigm
shift from external dominance to partnership, empowering African agency to
silence the guns and build enduring stability.
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